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Abstract
This article investigates NATO burden sharing in the 1990s in light of strategic, technological,
political and membership changes. Both an ability-to-pay and a benefits-received analysis of
burden sharing are conducted. During 1990￿99, there is no evidence of disproportionate burden
sharing, where the large allies shoulder the burdens of the small. Nevertheless, the theoretical
model predicts that this disproportionality will plague NATO in the near future. Thus far, there is
still a significant concordance between benefits received and defence burdens carried. When
alternative expansion scenarios are studied, the extent of disproportionality of burden sharing
increases as NATO grows in size. A broader security burden-sharing measure is devised and tested;
based on this broader measure, there is still no disproportionality evident in the recent past.
JEL classification: D70, H56, H40.
                                                                                                                                   
*Sandler is the Robert R. and Katheryn A. Dockson Chair in International Relations and Economics, University
of Southern California; Murdoch is the Director of the Bruton Center at the University of Texas-Dallas.
The authors greatly appreciate data assistance given by Aaron Birkland. They have also profited from
comments provided by Ron Smith. Sandler￿s research was supported, in part, by a NATO Fellowship. The
views expressed are solely those of the authors.Fiscal Studies
298
I. INTRODUCTION
In little more than four months, the Communist regimes in Europe, which had
posed the greatest threat to European security for 40 years, unravelled as the
Berlin Wall tumbled on 9￿10 November 1989, a democratic coalition
government formed in Czechoslovakia on 7 December 1989, Ceausecu￿s regime
collapsed on 22 December 1989 and the first free elections in a generation took
place in East Germany on 18 March 1990.
1 These events were followed by a
unified Germany joining NATO (3 October 1990), the official disbandment of
the Warsaw Pact (1 July 1991) and the demise of the Soviet Union (20
December 1991). But these developments, which marked the end to the cold war,
were not the only factors behind the momentous change in the nature of
European defence. Iraq￿s invasion of Kuwait on 1 August 1990 underscored that
security threats to NATO￿s resource supplies and interests could come from
￿rogue states￿ that operate outside international conventions and norms.
2 This
war also highlighted the recent revolution in military technologies, which would
be greatly perfected before their next large-scale deployment against Serbia in
1999. Changes in European defence also derived from NATO￿s adoption of a
new strategic doctrine in 1994 that calls for crisis management and peace
enforcement in places even outside of Europe whenever NATO￿s vital interests
are at risk.
3 Still other influential developments included NATO￿s expansion to
encompass some ex-Warsaw-Pact members and the significant downsizing of
defence budgets among most NATO allies with the exception of Greece and
Turkey.
These changes came so suddenly as to catch NATO policymakers
unprepared: almost overnight, threats to NATO security were no longer
necessarily from the east, nor were they necessarily even within Europe. As
such, allied forces now required the ability to be rapidly projected to theatres
outside of Europe. The next generation of weapons had to be more suited to
these new concerns and less geared to those of the cold war era of nuclear
deterrence. Security challenges also stemmed from transnational terrorism as
grievances in other regions of the world (for example, the Middle East) erupted
in European terrorist acts designed to capture world attention.
4 The potential
collapse of the transition economies and their potential return to Communism
presented yet another danger, which can be largely addressed through foreign
assistance intended to keep these emerging-market economies buoyant.
                                                                                                                                   
1Dates in this paragraph come from NATO Office of Information and Press (1995, pp. 295￿351) and Sandler
and Hartley (1999, pp. 52￿7).
2On rogue states and the threats that they pose, see Klare (1995) and Sandler and Hartley (1999, pp. 182￿92).
3This new doctrine and its genesis were discussed in Gompert and Larrabee (1997), Jordan (1995), Sandler and
Hartley (1999) and Thomson (1997).
4For a current assessment of the threat of transnational terrorism, consult Enders and Sandler (1999 and 2000)
and US Department of State (1999).Sharing NATO Defence Burdens
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Throughout its 50 years, NATO burden sharing has been a divisive issue. All
too frequently, the US has alleged that it has carried an ￿unfair￿ and
disproportionately large amount of the alliance burden (US Committee on
Armed Services, 1988). In recent years, the US Department of Defense (DOD)
must annually submit to Congress a report assessing allied contributions to the
common defence (see, for example, US DOD (1996 and 1999)). The European
allies have countered these charges of undercontributions by pointing out that
much of US defence spending is on non-European concerns and by devising
alternative burden-sharing measures that put their contributions in a better light.
Moreover, some European allies emphasised that they assumed disproportionate
burdens for UN peacekeeping and for other activities (for example, NATO
infrastructure). Any assessment of burden sharing faces at least two problems:
(1) how to measure relative burdens and (2) what activities to include in this
burden-sharing accounting.
To analyse the distribution of burdens among NATO allies, researchers have
followed the seminal study of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) and applied the
theory of pure public goods.
5 Subsequent studies have hypothesised that defence
expenditures yield multiple outputs that vary in their degree of publicness
(Sandler, 1977; van Ypersele de Strihou, 1967). By changing the mix of public
and private benefits associated with defence activities, recent changes to
NATO￿s strategic doctrine, weapon technologies, perceived threat and
membership composition can alter burden-sharing behaviour.
A primary purpose of this article is to investigate burden sharing in NATO in
the 1990s in light of recent changes. We apply theoretical insights from a joint
product model representation of alliances (Section II) to suggest empirical tests
of burden-sharing behaviour so as to assess the impact of recent alterations in
NATO￿s strategic environment on allied support of the alliance (Section III).
Empirical tests of burden sharing in the 1990s are based on two alternative
public finance principles: an ability-to-pay measure (Section IV) and a benefits-
received measure (Section V). Another purpose is to hypothesise how burden
sharing will change during the coming decade (Section VI). We are particularly
interested in this change under alternative expansion scenarios. A third purpose
is to devise a security burden-sharing measure that broadens security-promoting
activities to go beyond defence spending (Section VII). Concluding remarks
round out the study in Section VIII.
The empirical tests indicate that there is no evidence of disproportionate
burden sharing for 1990￿99, so that the large allies are not shouldering the
defence burdens for the small allies. In the latter 1990s, there is, however, a tiny
                                                                                                                                   
5This extensive literature has been surveyed recently by Murdoch (1995) and Sandler and Hartley (1999). Key
articles include McGuire (1990), Murdoch and Sandler (1982 and 1984), Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), Oneal
(1990), Oneal and Elrod (1989), Palmer (1990a, 1990b and 1991), Russett (1970), Sandler (1975, 1987 and
1993), Sandler and Cauley (1975), Smith (1989) and van Ypersele de Strihou (1967).Fiscal Studies
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drift upward in the positive (but insignificant) correlation between defence
burdens and the allies￿ national income, which suggests a gradual return to
disproportionate burden sharing, consistent with our theoretical prediction. This
return is anticipated to be more pronounced in the years to come as changes in
NATO￿s strategic environment have time to influence actions. When derived
benefits are compared with actual defence burdens carried, the match between
the two is still significant, indicating that the joint product model with its private
inducement to support defence is still relevant. If alliance-wide public benefits
increase in the ensuing decade as predicted, then this match may eventually
become insignificant. When alternative expansion scenarios are examined, the
extent of disproportionality of burden sharing increases if the alliance continues
to grow.
II. ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC GOOD MODELS
1. A Pure Public Good Model of Alliances
If defence is purely public for the allies, then the benefits associated with
defence must be non-rival and non-excludable. Defence benefits are non-rival
among allies when one ally￿s consumption of the unit of defence does not
detract, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available to
other allies from that same unit. Deterrence, as provided by strategic nuclear
weapons (for example, Trident submarines or B-2 stealth bombers), is non-rival
among allies because, once deployed, these weapons￿ ability to deter enemy
aggression is independent of the number of allies (or citizens) on whose behalf
the retaliatory threat is made, provided that the promised retaliation is automatic
and believable. If the allies underwriting deterrence have a ￿first-strike￿
advantage so that they can destroy enough of the enemy￿s nuclear arsenal in a
pre-emptive attack, then any return fire would be minimal and the retaliatory
pledge attains greater credibility. When, moreover, the strategic arsenal is
sufficiently large to absorb an attack and still possess enough surviving missiles
to deliver an unacceptable punishment to a would-be aggressor, the threatened
retaliation is credible and can be made on behalf of 15, 18 or more allies.
The benefits of a defence activity are non-excludable if they cannot be
withheld at an affordable cost by the provider. For strategic nuclear forces,
benefits are non-excludable whenever the defence provider(s) cannot fail to
deliver the pledged retaliatory response against an invader of another ally. If an
attack on one ally causes unacceptable collateral damage to the allies
underwriting the retaliatory response, then the promised retribution is likely to
ensue. This automatic response can also be triggered when the deterrence-
providing allies have sufficient investment interests, military troops, citizens or
other assets in a targeted ally to suffer greatly from any attack. During the cold
war, the large numbers of US troops and their dependants stationed in WestSharing NATO Defence Burdens
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Germany, the UK and Italy served as a tripwire to a US response if these host
allies were attacked. Thus it is understandable that, at first, the Europeans were
opposed to the announced US troop withdrawals from Europe after the cold war,
despite their complaints of negative externalities stemming from hosting US
troops. Given the proximity of France and the UK to other NATO allies in
Europe, these two nuclear allies would have great difficulty in excluding their
European allies and neighbours from any promised retaliation owing to collateral
damage.
Alliances that rely on deterrence to forestall an attack share a purely public
defence good, for which some essential implications follow. First, defence
burdens are anticipated to be shared unevenly with the largest allies, which have
the most to lose from an attack, assuming a disproportionately large burden in
relation to their gross domestic product (GDP).
6 The prediction that the large,
wealthy allies will shoulder the defence burdens for smaller, poorer allies is the
￿exploitation hypothesis￿. If, for example, the large ally spends $250 billion on
defence and a small ally desires to spend just $5 billion, then the small ally is
likely to spend very little, relying instead on the protection that spills over from
its large formidable ally. This conclusion rests on the purely public assumption
where the defence efforts of one ally are perfectly substitutable for those of
another. If, however, this substitutability is limited, then this disproportionality is
curtailed. Second, defence spending will be allocated in a suboptimal fashion,
which follows because each ally considers only its own marginal benefits and the
associated marginal costs when deciding defence provision. Optimality for a
pure public defence good requires that the alliance-wide sum of marginal
benefits be equated to marginal costs.
7 Third, the absence of rivalry in
consumption implies that all friendly nations can be included in the alliance, in
so far as only benefits arise from the expansion of an alliance. Fourth, co-
operation needs to be fostered to address suboptimal defence levels and can take
the form of ￿tight￿ alliance linkages, whereby allies sacrifice some of their
autonomy over their defence decision to the collective or a central authority
(Sandler and Forbes, 1980). Fifth, the match between benefits received from
defence and the actual defence burden is anticipated for many allies to be weak
owing to free riding, which shows up as a negative relationship between an ally￿s
real defence outlays and those of its allies.
2. Joint Product Representation of Alliances
Researchers noticed that after the mid-1960s (see Section IV) many of the
implications of the pure public good model of alliances did not hold (for
example, Russett (1970)) and, in response, offered a generalisation in the form of
                                                                                                                                   
6This was first formulated by Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).
7This was established in Samuelson (1954 and 1955). Sandler and Hartley (1999, Ch. 2) has a much more in-
depth analysis of these implications.Fiscal Studies
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a joint product model in which defence yields multiple outputs whose publicness
varies. In particular, defence activities can produce deterrence (a pure public
benefit), damage limitation or protection for times of conflict (an impure public
benefit) and ally-specific outputs (private benefits).
8 Defence outputs are
impurely public among allies when the associated benefits are either partially or
wholly excludable by the provider, or else partially rival among the allies.
Consider conventional forces, deployed along an alliance￿s perimeter to keep an
opposing side from penetrating its front. Because the actual deployment decision
can exclude one or more allies, conventional armaments and troops display
partially excludable benefits. Such forces are subject to a spatial rivalry in the
form of ￿force thinning￿ as a given army is spread over a longer exposed border.
Coalescing troops in one place along an alliance￿s border leads to vulnerabilities
elsewhere, and it is these resulting vulnerabilities that imply rivalry in
consumption.
Ally-specific benefits occur when a defence activity helps only the providing
ally and yields no benefit spillovers to others. In large part, the UK efforts to
thwart terrorism in Northern Ireland only benefited the UK. The same can be
said of the British forces stationed 12,000 kilometres away in the Falklands, or
British efforts to expel Argentine troops from the Falklands between 2 April and
14 June 1982. The recent build-up of Greek and Turkish forces to protect their
respective partitions of Cyprus yield largely ally-specific benefits. Unlike public
defence outputs, private ally-specific benefits motivate an ally to provide
defence, since these benefits cannot be derived from another ally￿s defence
efforts. Similarly, excludable impurely public defence benefits ￿ say, derived
from conventional forces assigned to the ally￿s borders ￿ also provide
incentives for an ally to contribute.
Consider the differences in the mix of outputs and the publicness of benefits
derived from strategic and conventional weapons. By their nature, strategic
weapons do not readily lend themselves to producing ally-specific benefits. Such
weapons cannot be used to threaten an insurgency into submission, nor can they
be assigned to thwart terrorism or provide disaster relief. If, moreover, these
forces have sufficient range, they can be deployed almost anywhere with little or
no thinning of strength, so that strategic nuclear forces yield primarily alliance-
wide purely public benefits. Some ally-specific benefits follow from the
provider￿s control of the launch button, whose possession can allow it to extract
some hegemonic concessions (Morrow, 1991). In contrast, conventional forces
possess a large share of ally-specific benefits and impurely public benefits.
While it is true that formidable conventional forces deter an enemy, they can
also further many ally-specific interests. Their deployment during a conflict is
impurely public owing to force thinning. In essence, the extent of publicness is
reflected in the ratio of excludable benefits (i.e. ally-specific and damage-
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limiting benefits) to total benefits received from a defence activity￿s outputs.
This ratio depends on the reigning strategic doctrine, weapon technology,
perceived threats and alliance composition. For example, curbing the threat
posed by the proliferation of nuclear forces, which is part of NATO￿s new crisis-
management doctrine, yields purely public benefits to NATO allies and any
nation in harm￿s way from such weapons.
The implications of the joint product model are at variance with those of the
purely public deterrence representation of an alliance. First, a high ratio of
excludable benefits implies that an ally must support its own defence, regardless
of its economic size, if it is going to be protected. As this ratio increases, the
exploitation hypothesis is anticipated to lose its relevancy, so that any
disproportionality between an ally￿s size and its defence burden is predicted to
decline. Second, the presence of excludable benefits allows markets and club
arrangements to promote preference revelation, thereby achieving a closer
equality between marginal benefits and marginal costs. As the ratio of
excludable benefits approaches one, this equality of margins becomes closer to
being satisfied, thus implying greater optimality. Free riding can be curtailed
with a sizeable helping of excludable benefits. Third, alliance size restrictions
hinge on the thinning of forces; allies with large exposed borders cause more
thinning and must contribute more conventional forces to offset this thinning
externality (Sandler, 1977). Because ally-specific benefits are not shared and
deterrence can be shared at zero costs, neither of these types of benefits
determines membership size. Fourth, alliance links can be kept loose and
unintegrated when the ratio of excludable benefits is large, in so far as
inefficiencies are small, calling for little co-operative correction. Fifth, the larger
is this ratio, the better is the match between benefits received and defence
burdens, because a payment must be made to acquire the excludable benefits.
The location and geographical properties of a prospective ally make a
difference for both the desirability of including this ally and the extent of its
bargaining strength if included. A conventional alliance can save costs owing to
the sequestration of interior borders that no longer require protection (Gardner,
1995, pp. 401￿6; Sandler, 1999). Consider an alliance of three contiguous square
countries of equal sizes lined up in a row.
9 Suppose that each country￿s sides are
of unit length costing 1 to protect. If each country provides its own defence, then
each expends 4 in protecting its perimeter from an attack in all directions. If,
instead, the countries form an alliance, then only 8 sides need protecting, leading
to a cost saving of 4. The middle country possesses a bargaining advantage,
because without its participation there would be no cost savings. Countries with
long exposed borders are less desirable entrants and, if admitted, are at a
bargaining disadvantage when cost savings from sequestered borders are
                                                                                                                                   
9The formation and expansion of NATO was analysed in Sandler (1999) based on cost savings from interior
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distributed. Potential non-contiguous allies, such as the Baltic states (Latvia,
Estonia and Lithuania), in which just Lithuania has a common 91-kilometre
border with Poland, have little to offer NATO and are unlikely entrants.
III. NATO DOCTRINES AND BURDEN SHARING
1. Mutual Assured Destruction: 1949￿66
NATO was initially confronted with a daunting challenge: a Soviet Union bent
on a westward expansion as it acquired satellite states. Unlike the NATO allies,
which had converted a large share of their defence industries to peacetime uses
by 1949, the Soviet Union had continued to run its defence industries at the same
wartime pace. As a consequence, the Soviet Union had acquired a conventional
weapon advantage, which meant that NATO had to rely on US superiority in
strategic nuclear weapons to counter any Soviet aggression. Thus the alliance
adopted a strategic doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), whereby any
Soviet territorial expansion involving NATO allies would trigger a devastating
nuclear attack. Directive MC 48, approved in 1954 by the North Atlantic
Council, allowed NATO to use strategic weapons to counter such aggression
(Rearden, 1995, p. 73). Any such US retaliatory response had credibility owing
to a US first-strike advantage, by which Soviet nuclear assets could be
neutralised by a pre-emptive strike. Thus the pledged US response could be
exercised with impunity. This reliance on strategic weapons meant that NATO￿s
security rested on purely public deterrence.
2. Flexible Response Eras: 1967￿80 and 1981￿90
The embarrassment experienced by the Soviet Union when it had to back down
during the Cuban missile crisis, owing to the US pre-emptive advantage, set in
motion a Soviet build-up of its strategic forces. As the US lost some of its
strategic advantage, NATO needed a new defence doctrine that would not result
in an immediate nuclear exchange during an exigency. In 1967, NATO adopted
directive MC 14/3, which embodied the doctrine of flexible response, whereby
NATO would respond in a measured way to Warsaw Pact challenges. The
doctrine envisioned a commensurate response to acts of aggression and allowed
for an escalation if necessary. As a result of this doctrine, strategic, tactical and
conventional forces became complementary as they had to be used together, so
that the extent of substitutability between allied forces and the incentives to free
ride diminished (Murdoch and Sandler, 1984). NATO allies that failed to
maintain their conventional forces became the weak link that might draw an
attack.
By relying on all three kinds of weapons, this 1967 doctrine meant that
defence activities within NATO yielded joint products with varying degrees ofSharing NATO Defence Burdens
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TABLE 1
NATO Doctrines, Defining Events and Underlying Model
Doctrines and defining events Model Implications
Mutual assured destruction 1949￿66
• Reliance on US strategic forces
• MC 48: NATO use of nuclear weapons
• NATO conventional inferiority





• Suboptimality and free riding
• Inclusive alliance (do not limit
size)
• Need for co-operation and tight
links
• Poor match between benefits
received and defence burdens
Doctrine of flexible response 1967￿80
• Reliance on conventional and strategic
forces
• Thinning of conventional forces
• MC 14/3 in 1967: flexible response
doctrine
• Complementarity between strategic and
conventional forces
• US troops and investments in Europe
Joint products • Reduced disproportionality of
burdens
• Less suboptimality
• Exclusive alliances (limit size)
• Looser alliance linkages
• Better match between benefits
received and defence burdens
Doctrine of flexible response 1981￿90
• France and UK strategic build-up
• Reagan procurement and strategic build-up
• Precision-guided munitions





• Some increase in
disproportionality
• More suboptimality
• Less exclusive alliance
• Need for tighter alliance links
• Reduced match between
benefits received and defence
burdens
Crisis management 1991￿2000
• Fall of Berlin Wall (9￿10 November 1989)
• Dissolution of Warsaw Pact and Soviet
Union
• Downsizing of defence spending
• Desert Shield and Desert Storm
• Rome Summit (7￿8 November 1991)
• Oslo Declaration (June 1992)
• Brussels Summit (10￿11 January 1994)
• Bosnia IFOR and SFOR
• NATO expansion (April 1999)







• Some increase in
disproportionality
• More suboptimality and free
riding
• Less exclusive alliance
• Need for tighter alliance links
• Reduced match between
benefits received and defence
burdens
• These predictions will take
some time to show up as
downsizing initially placed
more burdens on the small
alliesFiscal Studies
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publicness. In Table 1, we list the defining events and doctrines for MAD and
three subsequent strategic eras. On the right-hand side of the table, the
implications of the appropriate underlying model are tabulated. By 1981, a host
of events, as given on the left-hand side of Table 1, increased the share of non-
excludable, purely public benefits and, in so doing, are predicted to have the
influences indicated on the right. For example, the nuclear allies￿ build-up and
modernisation of their strategic arsenals increased the share of jointly produced
non-excludable public outputs. The deterrence derived from French and British
enhanced strategic forces provided non-excludable and non-rival benefits to the
other European allies.
When NATO adopted the forward-defence strategy or ￿deep strike￿ in 1984,
this flexible-response upgrade shifted the focus away from NATO￿s eastern
perimeter by relying on precision-guided munitions to target and destroy the
Warsaw Pact￿s rear-echelon forces. The new strategy reduced thinning and the
impurity of conventional forces, since their deployment along the front loses
some of its importance; nevertheless, this upgraded doctrine￿s reliance on
conventional forces still meant that excludable joint products are important. In
Table 1, we hypothesise that the net influence of these strategic, procurement
and technological events was to augment the share of non-excludable benefits
derived from defence. In other words, these events increased the publicness of
the defence activity and enhanced the concerns over disproportionate burdens
and suboptimality, which the first era of flexible response greatly corrected.
3. Crisis-Management Doctrine: 1991￿2000
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the flexible-response strategy to an eastern
attack lost much of its relevancy. The immediate impact was defence downsizing
to take advantage of a peace dividend. As the large allies downsized to a greater
extent relative to the smaller allies, defence burdens should at first shift to the
latter ￿ a tendency enhanced by Greek and Turkish military build-ups. The Gulf
War of 1991 underscored that threats to NATO￿s interests can come from so-
called rogue nations. As Communist regimes in Europe collapsed, ethnic
conflicts, once held in check by powerful governments, erupted and threatened
stability in Europe.
These developments and the need to reshape NATO to the post-cold-war era
resulted in a new strategic doctrine (see Table 1), which first emerged at a Rome
summit on 7￿8 November 1991 when the Ministers acknowledged that NATO
must assume responsibility for ensuring Europe￿s security from challenges both
within and beyond NATO￿s boundaries (Asmus, 1997, p. 37). During an Oslo
summit in 1992, NATO included peacekeeping as part of its new strategic crisis-
management doctrine, which required the development of multilateral rapid-
deployment forces with air, land and maritime components, known as CombinedSharing NATO Defence Burdens
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Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). At the Brussels Summit on 10￿11 January 1994,
NATO allies agreed officially to develop these CJTFs and to broaden the
strategic doctrine to include policing the non-proliferation of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction. NATO peacekeeping troops were deployed in
Bosnia in December 1995 as an Implementation Force (IFOR) for the Dayton
peace agreement. A year later, this force became the Stabilisation Force (SFOR),
which is still in Bosnia in 2000. In June 1999, another contingent of NATO
peacekeeping troops were dispatched as part of the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force
(KFOR), following the NATO springtime bombing campaign against Serbia.
There are a number of factors that promote a hypothesised increase in
publicness. First, peacekeeping and crisis-management activities, if successful,
provide an increased measure of world stability and security that benefits all
nations ￿ contributors and non-contributors —  so that benefits are non-
excludable and non-rival.
10 Second, allies that acquire sufficient capacity to
project forces to trouble spots are likely to provide a free ride in times of crises
for allies that have not invested in this capability. During the Gulf War, the US
transported much of the coalition￿s equipment from Europe (Klare, 1995). Only
the four largest allies ￿ the US, the UK, France and Germany ￿ are currently
making sizeable investments in their power-projecting capacity (Sandler and
Hartley, 1999). Third, R&D breakthroughs associated with the revolution in
military technologies can yield non-rival, though excludable, benefits. The US,
the UK and France spend the most on weapon R&D (Hartley, 1997, p. 31). The
experience in Kosovo is instructive: most of the bombing missions were flown
by the US military because of the sophisticated ordnance involved and the
adverse weather conditions. As the technology gap in weapons expands between
the large and small allies, this disproportionality of burdens should increase.
This follows because only the few largest NATO allies can afford the huge fixed
costs associated with the new generations of weapons. In fact, only the US has
the means to make the necessary investments, so that the technology gap, so
prevalent during Kosovo, is apt to open wider.
This increased share of purely public joint products will eventually increase
free riding and thus place a greater burden on the richest allies once the effects
of downsizing are finished. In addition, there is eventually expected to be a
reduced match between defence benefits received and burdens carried, so that
greater co-operation will someday be needed if allied efforts are to be efficiently
allocated. The search for these relationships in Sections IV and V requires some
caveats. The crisis-management shares of the allies￿ defence budget are still
small for 1990￿99, so that this movement to increased publicness may not yet be
                                                                                                                                   
10On the publicness of peacekeeping, see Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu (1998 and 1999).Fiscal Studies
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evident. Similarly, the build-up of rich allies￿ transport capacity is occurring in
1998￿2005 and, except for 1998￿99, will not be reflected in the data.
11
IV. ABILITY TO PAY AND BURDEN SHARING
The standard burden-sharing measure for defence, used to reflect the ability to
pay, is the share of GDP devoted to military expenditures (i.e. ME/GDP).
Division by GDP normalises the burden based on the allies￿ capacity to pay.
Other burden-sharing measures (for example, military expenditures per capita
and military manpower per capita) have been applied, but are less useful because
they either include only a portion of the military activity or else do not really
account for an ally￿s true ability to underwrite its defence spending.
12 Since the
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) study, disproportionality of defence burdens is
typically tested non-parametrically by checking the correlation between the
allies￿ defence burdens ranks and their GDP ranks. If a significant positive
correlation exists, then this indicates that the rich allies carried a
disproportionately large burden of defence spending. The standard test statistics
are the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (ρ) and the Kendall rank
correlation coefficient or the Kendall tau (τ).
The alternative (Ha) and null (H0) hypotheses for a rank correlation test are
Ha: Within NATO, there is a positive association between the allies￿ GDP
and their share of GDP devoted to military expenditure.
H0: There is no association between these variables.
Table 2 indicates the past findings of these tests for various periods from
1950 to 1992. Previous studies have all found a significant positive rank
correlation for 1950￿66, thus rejecting the null hypothesis in favour of the
alternative hypothesis. These results are consistent with the pure public
deterrence model￿s prediction that the rich allies carried the defence burden of
the small allies during the MAD era. At the start of flexible response, the
positive correlations were insignificant except for 1973 during the Vietnam War.
This finding suggests that considerations other than size directed burden sharing
during the beginning of flexible response when ally-specific and excludable joint
products provided allies with greater interests to contribute to defence. Thus this
empirical result is consistent with the joint product model￿s prediction that
economic size becomes less of a determinant of defence burden sharing. During
the second half of flexible response in the early 1980s, there was some increase
in this correlation, which remained insignificant.
                                                                                                                                   
11For example, the US plans to spend over $20 billion on strategic mobility over the next five years (US
Congressional Budget Office, 1997, Table 3).
12Hartley and Sandler (1999) provide a discussion of alternative burden-sharing measures and why ME/GDP is
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TABLE 2
Past Studies of Defence Burdens and Ability to Pay
Study Test Year(s) Conclusion
Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966 Spearman
rank
correlation
1964 Significant positive rank
correlation between ME/GNP
and GNP.
van Ypersele de Strihou, 1968 Regression 1955, 1963 Significant coefficient on GNP
when ME/GNP is regressed
against the log of GNP.
Russett, 1970 Kendall τ 1950￿67 Significant rank correlation
between ME/GNP and GNP for
all sample years, with a marked
decline in correlation starting in
1961.
Sandler and Forbes, 1980 Kendall τ 1960￿75 Significant rank correlation








a Significant percentage of
variance of ME/GDP is
explained by GDP during 1953￿
68. After 1968, only an
insignificant percentage of this
variance is explained.
Khanna and Sandler, 1996 Kendall τ 1960￿92 Many significant rank
correlations between ME/GDP
and GDP during 1960￿66. No
significant rank correlations are
found after 1966. During the late
1970s and early 1980s, these
correlations are elevated but not
significant.
aFor selected years.
We now update these earlier burden-sharing studies using data from 1988￿99.
The null hypothesis is tested with the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation
coefficient (Mendenhall and Beaver, 1991). Spearman￿s ρ statistic is calculated
in the same fashion as the familiar Pearson correlation coefficient except that the
ranks of the data replace the actual measurements, making the statistic robust to
outliers and minor measurement errors that do not alter the rankings. Moreover,
this statistic makes no parametric demands on the distributions of the GDP and
defence burden data. This is ideal for our situation in so far as some relatively
large allies (for example, the US) are grouped with some small ones (for
example, Luxemburg), making it unlikely that the GDP observations areFiscal Studies
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generated from the same distribution. The tests of the relationship between
defence burden and GDP are apt to suffer from confounding influences. For
instance, a longer exposed border generally necessitates greater defensive
expenditures. To the extent that larger nations tend to have greater GDP, the
strength of the defence burden and GDP relationship appears greater owing to
this confounding variable. To assess the role of potential confounding
influences, we also test the hypotheses using Spearman￿s partial correlation
coefficients. Intuitively, a partial coefficient measures the correlation of the
residuals of two regressions: the first set comes from a regression of defence
burden ranks on (say) exposed borders, while the second comes from a
regression on GDP and exposed borders. With the partial correlation coefficient,
we thus remove any explanatory power of the confounding variable before
computing the statistic.
13
The dataset for the updated burden-sharing tests in Sections IV and V
includes observations on military expenditures, GDP, exchange rates, population
(POP), imports (IMP), exports (EXP) and exposed borders. For the 15 NATO
allies (minus Iceland), we have data for 1988￿99. The data on ME for 1988￿98
were obtained from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1999),
while ME estimates for 1999 of the NATO allies were taken from NATO (1999).
In the case of exposed borders (length in kilometres of borders with non-NATO
nations plus coastlines), data were obtained from the US Central Intelligence
Agency (1999). With some minor exceptions, data on the remaining variables
were taken from International Monetary Fund (1999a and 1999b).
14 Each ally￿s
openness measure equals its sum of exports and imports as a share of the
country￿s GDP. Currency-based data for ME, GDP, IMP and EXP were
expressed in nominal US dollars using the current average exchange rate for
each year of data with the exception of the EU countries in 1999. For these
observations, data were expressed in US dollars using the 1 January 1999
exchange rates adjusted by the value of the Euro on 1 July 1999.
In Table 3, the Spearman rank correlations between defence burdens and
GDP are given annually for the 1988￿99 period. Numbers in parentheses beneath
the various Spearman ρ coefficients indicate the prob-values or the probability of
                                                                                                                                   
13While several non-parametric statistics are available to test for association, two in particular ￿ Kendall￿s τ
and Spearman￿s ρ ￿ readily extend to partial measures. We employed the Spearman ρ because the sampling
distribution for Kendall￿s partial τ is unknown. To obtain prob-values for this τ, we would have to resort to
some sort of simulation (for example, Hoflund (1963)). Although not presented here, we also estimated the
alternative Kendall￿s τs and found that the patterns of the correlations are essentially identical to those reported
with Spearman￿s ρ below.
14The exceptions are as follows. The GDPs for Portugal in 1997, 1998 and 1999 were inferred from the ratio of
ME to GDP as reported in US Department of Defense (1999). For countries with incomplete series on imports
and exports, our measure of openness in Section V was estimated as the previous year￿s value. In cases where
population is missing, we used the previous year￿s value to complete the series.Sharing NATO Defence Burdens
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TABLE 3














































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are prob-values, indicating the probability of a type I error when testing the null
hypothesis of no association between ME/GDP and GDP versus the alternative hypothesis of a positive
association.
Variables: 1 = ME/GDP; 2 = GDP; 3 = GDP/POP; 4 = exposed borders.
aSimple rank correlation coefficient.
bPartial rank correlation coefficient with GDP/POP held constant.
cPartial rank correlation coefficient with GDP/POP and exposed borders held constant.
dThe number of allies is 18 for 1999, since Iceland is excluded.
a type I error when testing for no association. Prob-values of 0.05 or less would
reflect statistically significant coefficients. In the second column, the simple rank
correlation coefficients, ρ12, are displayed, all of which are insignificant. The
positive and insignificant rank correlations for 1988￿96 decline in value during
the post-cold-war period, indicating less correlation between economic size and
defence burdens. This finding is consistent with the smaller allies cutting back
on defence spending during this period by less than the large allies. Additionally,
the absence of correlation between economic size and defence burdens suggestsFiscal Studies
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the continued applicability of the joint product model during the post-cold-war
era. In 1997￿99, there is a small increase in this rank correlation, which might
forebode that the crisis-management doctrine and other developments are
beginning to have their anticipated impact on burden sharing. It is, however, apt
to take more years of crisis-management activities and the build-up of mobile
forces before the predicted disproportionality shows up. The last two columns of
Table 3 contain partial rank correlation coefficients with GDP per capita held
constant and with GDP per capita and exposed borders held constant,
respectively. Both partial rank correlation coefficients show an identical pattern
to that of the simple rank correlation. When GDP per capita is held constant, the
positive correlations are slightly elevated from the simple rank correlations. A
similar result applies for 1988￿91 but not for 1992￿99 when both GDP per
capita and exposed borders are held constant. After 1992, this partial rank
correlation displays the same trend as the simple rank correlation but is
smaller.
15 These findings imply no exploitation of the large by the small during
the post-cold-war period.
V. BENEFIT MEASURES AND BURDEN SHARING
Benefits from defence spending arise from what is protected by both
conventional and strategic arsenals: the ally￿s industrial base, its population and
its exposed borders. To calculate an overall measure for these defence benefits,
we followed the methodology of Sandler and Forbes (1980) and computed each
ally￿s share of NATO￿s GDP (i.e. ally￿s GDP/NATO GDP), its share of NATO￿s
population and its share of NATO￿s exposed borders. Myriad weighting schemes
can be devised to aggregate these three benefit measures to derive some
aggregate benefit share for each ally. In essence, the appropriate weights depend
on an ally￿s preferences, which are not known nor easily observed. As a
reasonable proxy in light of our ignorance, we weighted these shares equally by
adding them up and dividing by three for an ￿average benefit share￿.
If the average benefit share is a good predictor of an ally￿s actual defence
burden share within NATO (ME/NATO ME), then the distributions of the two
measures should be similar, i.e. there should be no systematic difference between
them. This new burden-sharing measure represents between-ally sharing in
contrast to the earlier ME/GDP measure which denotes within-ally sharing based
on country-specific variables. To determine the correspondence between defence
burdens and its benefits, we used a Wilcoxon signed-rank test which is a non-
                                                                                                                                   
15Other partial rank correlations, not displayed, (for example, holding exposed borders constant) indicate the
same results: all coefficients are insignificant and the coefficient pattern over time is the same as those in Table
3.Sharing NATO Defence Burdens
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parametric alternative to the familiar paired difference test (Mendenhall and
Beaver, 1991).
16 The alternative hypothesis (H2a) and null hypothesis (H20) are
H2a: The distributions of defence burdens and average benefit shares for the
NATO allies are different.
H20: The distributions of defence burdens and average benefit shares for the
NATO allies are the same.
In our case of N = 15 for 1990￿98, the critical value for the Wilcoxon R statistic
is 25 at the 5 per cent level of significance for a two-tailed test. The null
hypothesis is rejected when R is less than or equal to 25. For 1999, N = 18 and
the critical Wilcoxon R statistic is then 40.
Before presenting the results for the 1990s, we review three studies that
compared defence burdens and average benefit shares for earlier periods. Sandler
and Forbes (1980) uncovered a much closer match between defence burdens and
their benefit proxies in 1975 than in 1960 during MAD, where the underlying
distributions were different. Khanna and Sandler (1996 and 1997) were unable to
reject the null hypothesis H20 at intervals for 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1990,
thus leading to the conclusion that during much of the flexible-response era there
was a statistically significant match between defence burdens and their benefits.
This finding supports the joint product model over the purely public deterrent
model as the underlying paradigm. For 1985, however, at the height of the
Reagan defence build-up, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the
alternative hypothesis. Thus the Reagan administration￿s concentration on
procurement and the build-up of strategic, tactical and other armaments appeared
to increase the extent of publicness in the defence activity and, in so doing,
induced more free riding, thus breaking the match between defence burdens and
defence benefits.
Our update for the 1990s is indicated in Tables 4 and 5, where defence
burdens and average benefit shares are displayed annually for 1990￿94 and
1995￿99, respectively. Data sources were the same as those described in Section
IV for the Spearman test. As in this previous test, current-year nominal data were
converted to nominal US dollars using that year￿s exchange rates. For each
country, its share of NATO￿s GDP, population and exposed borders were
computed and then averaged. In each table, the left column beneath each year is
the actual defence burden, while the right column is the average benefit share.
For example, in 1990, France assumed 8.45 per cent of NATO total defence
spending, while it received a benefit share of 6.39 per cent, thus implying an
                                                                                                                                   
16The Wilcoxon test involves (i) assigning ranks based on the absolute value of the differences between the two
measures and (ii) computing the sum of the ranks with positive differences and the sum with negative
differences. The smaller of these two rank sums is the R statistic of interest, and its critical values are available
in most introductory statistics books.TABLE 4
Defence Burdens and Average Benefit Shares in NATO using Population, GDP and Exposed Borders
as Proxies for Benefits: 1990–94


























Belgium 0.92 1.03 0.96 1.00 0.81 1.02 0.78 1.01 0.84 1.01
Denmark 0.52 1.30 0.56 1.28 0.56 1.28 0.56 1.27 0.58 1.28
France 8.45 6.39 8.90 6.20 8.86 6.27 8.86 6.16 9.45 6.19
Germany 8.39 7.58 8.23 8.67 8.25 8.97 7.74 8.92 7.73 8.99
Greece 0.77 2.11 0.79 2.10 0.86 2.11 0.85 2.10 0.92 2.10
Italy 4.64 5.93 5.07 5.81 4.91 5.76 4.28 5.24 4.34 5.19
Luxemburg 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05
Netherlands 1.47 1.54 1.51 1.51 1.55 1.53 1.47 1.53 1.52 1.54
Norway 0.67 2.81 0.69 2.80 0.75 2.80 0.66 2.78 0.72 2.78
Portugal 0.37 0.98 0.44 0.98 0.50 1.00 0.46 0.98 0.46 0.97
Spain 1.80 3.73 1.90 3.71 1.78 3.72 1.72 3.50 1.58 3.44
Turkey 1.05 4.12 1.18 4.08 1.21 4.11 1.47 4.21 1.13 4.10
UK 7.89 6.69 8.99 6.59 7.92 6.50 7.09 6.27 7.33 6.33
Canada 2.29 25.82 2.33 25.77 2.13 25.63 2.14 25.62 2.03 25.55
US 60.74 29.93 58.42 29.45 59.90 29.24 61.91 30.35 61.33 30.47
NATO-Europe 36.97 44.26 39.25 44.78 37.97 45.13 35.95 44.03 36.64 43.98
NATO-North-America 63.03 55.74 60.75 55.22 62.03 54.87 64.05 55.97 63.36 56.02
Notes: Figures represent percentage shares of NATO￿s total for each variable. For example, defence burden indicates the ally￿s defence spending divided by total
NATO defence spending. Average benefit share denotes the sum of each ally￿s shares of NATO￿s population, NATO￿s GDP and NATO￿s exposed borders,
divided by three. The totals for NATO-Europe and NATO-North-America may not add up due to rounding.TABLE 5
Defence Burdens and Average Benefit Shares in NATO using Population, GDP and Exposed Borders
as Proxies for Benefits: 1995–99


























Belgium 0.94 1.06 0.91 1.02 0.83 0.97 0.82 0.96 0.75 0.90
Czech Republic 0.25 0.59
Denmark 0.66 1.31 0.66 1.31 0.62 1.28 0.63 1.27 0.59 1.21
France 10.12 6.34 9.95 6.23 9.17 5.93 9.01 5.90 8.28 5.53
Germany 8.72 9.34 8.36 9.03 7.38 8.51 7.33 8.77 6.80 7.69
Greece 1.07 2.12 1.20 2.12 1.22 2.11 1.29 2.10 1.27 2.02
Hungary 0.16 0.70
Italy 4.10 5.12 5.03 5.28 4.82 5.13 5.12 5.06 4.82 5.43
Luxemburg 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05
Netherlands 1.70 1.60 1.68 1.56 1.52 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.38 1.41
Norway 0.72 2.81 0.79 2.82 0.74 2.81 0.71 2.78 0.68 2.69
Poland 0.70 2.14
Portugal 0.57 0.99 0.56 0.98 0.56 0.97 0.53 0.95 0.50 0.91
Spain 1.83 3.50 1.85 3.49 1.66 3.38 1.65 3.36 1.59 3.18
Turkey 1.40 4.18 1.61 4.20 1.60 4.26 1.84 4.22 2.20 3.94
UK 7.17 6.29 7.40 6.30 7.89 6.52 8.17 6.56 7.54 6.25
Canada 1.92 25.50 1.81 25.52 1.71 25.57 1.50 25.47 1.60 24.67
US 59.06 29.80 58.18 30.07 60.25 31.01 59.85 31.06 60.87 30.66
NATO-Europe 39.02 44.69 40.01 44.41 38.04 43.43 38.65 43.47 37.54 44.66
NATO-North-America 60.98 55.31 59.99 55.59 61.96 56.57 61.35 56.53 62.46 55.34
Notes: See Table 4.Fiscal Studies
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overpayment. In that same year, the Netherlands covered 1.47 per cent of
NATO￿s aggregate defence spending, which is almost a perfect match for its
average benefit share of 1.54 per cent. Other figures are interpreted similarly.
The Wilcoxon R statistics for these years are: 39 in 1990; 39 in 1991; 37 in
1992; 33 in 1993; 35 in 1994; 37 in 1995; 40 in 1996; 38 in 1997; 41 in 1998;
and 45 in 1999. Because none of the R statistics is less than 25 (or 40 for 1999),
we cannot reject the null hypothesis; hence there is evidence of a match between
defence burdens and our proxy measure of defence benefits for each year of the
1990s.
17 Based on this comparison, the joint product model still describes
behaviour in the post-cold-war years, but the match is less significant for 1999,
consistent with the increasing share of public benefits. As long as the associated
distributions for defence burdens and benefits are the same, there is support for
NATO￿s current loosely integrated alliance, because suboptimality is limited by
this concordance.
Figure 1 splices together a key finding of the Khanna and Sandler (1996)
study with that of this study. The three time series displayed show the difference
between actual defence burdens and those predicted by the average benefit share
for the two North American allies, the three nuclear allies and the four largest
allies (i.e. the three nuclear allies plus Germany). In so far as each time series
FIGURE 1
Difference between Actual and Predicted Defence Burdens:

























                                                                                                                                   
17We also computed the defence burdens and benefits for 1988 and 1989, and found R statistics of 35 and 29,

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































shows the same pattern, we focus on the time series for North America, where
this difference declined between 1970 and 1980 as flexible response shifted
more defence burdens to Europe. The Reagan build-up reversed this shift. Since
1985, the overall trend for this difference is downward, except for 1999 where a
small rise is noted. The pattern for exploitation, reflected by these time series for
various aggregates of the large allies, is closely in keeping with our theoretical
predictions.
Next, we broadened the proxy for average benefit shares to include a fourth
benefit measure of openness. In a secure environment, an ally also gains from
international trade. To devise a measure for the relative benefit that an ally
derives from its openness ({exports + imports}/GDP), we calculated an ally￿s
share of NATO￿s aggregate openness, which equals an ally￿s openness divided
by the sum of these openness measures for the alliance. Average benefit shares
were then computed by summing each ally￿s four benefit shares and dividing by
four. In Table 6, we depict defence burdens and the new average benefit shares
for five selected years in the 1990s. Other years display very similar values. The
Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic equals: 37 in 1991; 29 in 1992; 28 in 1993;
30 in 1994; 32 in 1995; 32 in 1996; 31 in 1997; and 33 in 1998.
18 For these new
R statistics, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level of
significance. Thus we again conclude that there is evidence of a match between
defence burdens paid and defence benefits received. This inclusion of another
benefit measure indicates that the results are not so sensitive to the benefit
proxies chosen.
VI. ALTERNATIVE NATO EXPANSION SCENARIOS
With the inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in NATO in
March 1999, NATO confronts new concerns about burden sharing. As the
alliance expands, a greater heterogeneity of tastes is introduced at a time when
the theory of alliances predicts more disproportionate burden sharing in the
future with large allies assuming increased burdens in terms of the proportion of
GDP devoted to defence. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme, started in
1994, is geared to preparing other nations for NATO membership and fostering
co-operation between NATO and the countries of eastern and central Europe
(Gompert and Larrabee, 1997; Sandler and Hartley, 1999, p. 19).
To investigate what might be the impact of alternative expansion scenarios,
we conducted a thought experiment which allows for nine possible alliance-
composition scenarios:
                                                                                                                                   
18Because openness data were not available for 1999, this year was not examined with the four-proxy benefit
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•   Scenario 1 is NATO 15 (excluding Iceland and the three entrants);
•   Scenario 2 is NATO 18 (excluding Iceland);
•   Scenario 3 is NATO 18, Slovenia and Slovakia;
•   Scenario 4 is NATO 18, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania;
•   Scenario 5 is NATO 18, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and the three Baltic
states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania);
•   Scenario 6 consists of Scenario 2 allies plus the neutrals (Austria, Finland,
Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland);
•   Scenario 7 consists of Scenario 3 allies plus the neutrals;
•   Scenario 8 consists of Scenario 4 allies plus the neutrals; and
•   Scenario 9 consists of Scenario 5 allies plus the neutrals.
Scenario 1 is, of course, NATO prior to March 1999, while Scenario 2 is NATO
today. The remaining scenarios are numbered from 3 to 5 or from 6 to 9,
according to their likelihood of being realised, where smaller numbers are
associated with more likely cases. These scenarios and their likelihood are based
on locational and spatial considerations (i.e. exposed borders and geographical
position) as well as political considerations as analysed in Sandler (1999). For
example, Slovenia and Slovakia are the most likely entrants, because each has
relatively little exposed border so that their admittance saves on cost by
sequestering interior borders of existing allies. Moreover, these two countries do
not face insurgencies or border disputes. In contrast, the inclusion of the Baltic
states does little, except for a small contiguous border with Poland, to sequester
borders. Moreover, their inclusion is rigorously opposed by Russia, thus
implying political costs.
Our thought experiment first consisted of computing the Spearman rank
correlations between defence burdens and GDP for various scenarios in 1998 to
ascertain how burdens would be shared. This experiment implies that new allies
do not alter their share of GDP for defence, which, if the behaviour of the three
recent entrants is any indication, is a reasonable assumption. As in the case of
the NATO 15, the data for these three NATO entrants, the other prospective
entrants and the neutral nations are obtained as follows: ME from Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (1999); exposed borders from US Central
Intelligence Agency (1999); and POP from International Monetary Fund (1999a
and 1999b).
In Table 7, we display various Spearman rank correlation coefficients and
their prob-values. The scenarios are indicated in the first column, while the
number of observations is given in the second column. In the third column, the
simple rank correlations increase in value as the number of allies increases for
the five scenarios without the neutrals. This result suggests that, as the alliance
expands, the extent of disproportionate burden sharing increases. This outcome
is in complete agreement with the general principles of collective action whereFiscal Studies
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TABLE 7
Spearman Rank Correlations between ME/GDP and GDP

















































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are prob-values, indicating the probability of a type I error when testing the null
hypothesis of no association between ME/GDP and GDP versus the alternative hypothesis of a positive
association.
Variables: 1 = ME/GDP; 2 = GDP; 3 = GDP/POP; 4 = exposed borders.
aScenario 1 is NATO 15 excluding Iceland.
Scenario 2 is NATO 15 plus three new entrants (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).
Scenario 3 is NATO 18, Slovenia and Slovakia.
Scenario 4 is NATO 18, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania.
Scenario 5 consists of Scenario 4 plus three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).
Scenario 6 is NATO 18 plus five neutrals (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland).
Scenario 7 is NATO 18, five neutrals, Slovenia and Slovakia.
Scenario 8 consists of Scenario 7 plus Romania.
Scenario 9 consists of Scenario 8 plus three Baltic countries.
bSimple rank correlation coefficient.
cPartial rank correlation coefficient with GDP/POP held constant.
dPartial rank correlation coefficient with exposed borders held constant.
ePartial rank correlation coefficient with GDP/POP and exposed borders held constant.
free riding increases with group size (Olson, 1965; Sandler, 1992). For the
scenarios involving the neutrals, this increasing disproportionality only arises
with the addition of the Baltic states. Interestingly, the neutrals share burdens



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Abbreviations and notes for Table 8
NA = not applicable.
DB = defence burden.
ABS = average benefit share.
Notes: Figures represent percentage shares of NATO￿s total for each variable. For example, DB indicates the
ally￿s defence spending divided by total NATO defence spending. ABS denotes the sum of each ally￿s shares of
NATO￿s population, NATO￿s GDP and NATO￿s exposed borders, divided by three.
aValues in parentheses indicate the critical value below which the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent
level.
GDP devoted to defence. When Scenarios 2 and 6 are compared for the simple
rank correlation, there is increased disproportionality, but it is rather limited for
the addition of so many nations. Scenarios 5 and 9 suggest that the inclusion of
the Baltic states is apt to have an important negative impact on burden sharing.
Nearly identical patterns arise for the partial Spearman rank correlations in the
fourth and sixth columns. When, however, the partial rank correlation holds only
exposed borders constant, no clear pattern emerges in the fifth column except
that the addition of the Baltic states leads to an augmented disproportionality in
burden sharing.
As a second thought experiment, we computed the average benefit shares and
defence burdens for Scenarios 2￿9, where the former were based on each ally￿s
shares of POP, GDP and exposed borders. In Table 8, we display these defence
burdens and benefit shares for only five of eight scenarios to conserve space.
19
The Wilcoxon R statistic, along with the critical values below which the null
hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent level, is displayed in the last row. The
null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis of different
underlying distributions for Scenarios 5 and 9, but not for Scenarios 2, 4 and 6.
For the scenarios not depicted in Table 8, the Wilcoxon R and its critical value
(in parentheses) are: 61 (52) for Scenario 3; 87 (90) for Scenario 7; and 91 (98)
for Scenario 8. Thus defence burdens and defence benefits do not match for the
inclusion of the Baltic states and three of the four scenarios involving the neutral
countries. These findings suggest that expanding the NATO alliance much
beyond the inclusion of Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania will create greater
inefficiency in resource allocation as benefits and burdens of defence are poorly
matched.
VII. SECURITY BURDEN SHARING
Until now, there has been no convincing or successful effort in the literature to
define a broader security burden-sharing measure that includes allies￿ defence
efforts, peacekeeping support and foreign-aid activities. Surely peacekeeping
bolsters overall security, while foreign assistance does the same by creating more
robust and stable economies in developing countries. It is instructive to see how
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the US DOD addresses this security burden-sharing issue in its annual Report on
Allied Contributions to Common Defense to the US Congress (see, for example,
US DOD (1996 and 1999)). In essence, this report merely presents a rank for
each security-enhancing activity and allows readers to draw their own
conclusions. Suppose that Norway is highly ranked in peacekeeping and foreign
assistance but is lowly ranked in its defence burden as a share of GDP. Are we
then to conclude that Norway assumes a respectable burden? This is a hasty
conclusion because the expenditure levels on peacekeeping and foreign aid are
typically dwarfed by that on defence, so that doing more than one￿s share on the
first two does not necessarily offset a small defence burden. Taking an average
of these ranks, as done by Hartley and Sandler (1999), is also ill advised because
this procedure implicitly assumes that the amounts spent are of similar
magnitudes.
The security burden index proposed here adjusts for differential spending on
alternative security-promoting activities. If security derives from defence,
peacekeeping and foreign aid, then the proposed measure sums the expenditures
on each and then divides this sum by GDP. Ranks are assigned for these security
burdens and then compared with each ally￿s GDP ranks. We performed these
computations for 1994￿97 in the base case of 15 NATO allies, using data on
defence spending, peacekeeping expenditure and foreign aid from US DOD
(1999). Because this report presents the data in real 1998 US dollars, current-
year nominal values for other variables (for example, GDP) had to be converted
into real 1998 US dollars. These real figures were obtained by first ￿deflating￿
the own-country values to 1998 with their respective GDP price deflator before
converting to dollars with the 1998 average exchange rate. Deflation of the own-
country values is accomplished by multiplying by the ratio of the 1998 price
deflator to the annual price deflator. The price deflators are from International
Monetary Fund (1999a and 1999b).
20
In Table 9, we present the various Spearman rank correlation coefficients
between our security burden measure and GDP. The most interesting finding is
that the results in Table 9 are closely related to those in Table 3, where only
defence burdens are correlated with GDP for comparable years. In fact, the
broader measure shows a slightly elevated, but highly insignificant, positive
correlation. The elevated values suggest not only that the defence burdens
overwhelm the peacekeeping and foreign assistance burdens for these years, but
also that the smaller countries are not, on average, carrying more of the latter two
combined burdens. If peacekeeping continues to grow in importance and if,
moreover, these burdens are shouldered by the large allies, as projected here,
                                                                                                                                   
20For countries with incomplete GDP price deflator series, we applied the rate of change in the consumer price
index (also available from International Monetary Fund (1999a)) to the available GDP price deflators to
complete the series.Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 9





























Note: Numbers in parentheses are prob-values, indicating the probability of a type I error when testing the null
hypothesis of no association between the security burden and GDP versus the alternative hypothesis of a
positive association.
Variables: 1 = ME/GDP; 2 = GDP; 3 = GDP/POP; 4 = exposed borders.
aSimple rank correlation coefficient.
bPartial rank correlation coefficient with GDP/POP held constant.
cPartial rank correlation coefficient with GDP/POP and exposed borders held constant.
then the rank correlation between the security burdens and GDP will increase
and may culminate in disproportionate burden sharing as in the MAD era.
Clearly, the argument that a broader security measure would reverse findings
based solely on defence burdens is not supported here. The technique put
forward for computing a security burden can be extended to include additional
security-promoting activities.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the threat of nuclear Armageddon has subsided greatly since the
conclusion of the cold war, Europe and its North American allies still confront
myriad common security challenges from crisis management, ethnic unrests,
weapons of mass destruction proliferation, rogue nations, transnational terrorism
and a Russia at war with some of its ex-republics. As the nature of the threats
changes, NATO must respond with new weapons, technology, logistical
doctrines and strategies. By changing the publicness character of the shared
defence activities, these developments can have profound influences on resource
allocation within NATO. The NATO alliance provides a means for collective
security at a bargain price, but poses collective action problems from free riding,
inefficient resource allocations and disproportionate burden sharing.
This paper has applied the theoretical and empirical tools from the economic
study of alliances to take stock of free riding, burden sharing and related issues
in the past. More important, we have provided an up-to-date analysis of these
resource-allocation concerns for NATO in the 1990s. In the process, we haveSharing NATO Defence Burdens
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shown that the joint product model still applies during the current crisis-
management era. There continues to be a concordance between benefits received
and defence burdens borne by the allies. Moreover, there is no evidence yet of
disproportionate burdens being shouldered by the large allies. At this point in
time, NATO￿s loosely integrated institutional structure therefore remains
appropriate. Nevertheless, theoretical arguments are put forward that hypothesise
that defence burden sharing will become more disproportionately carried by the
large allies in the future as spending on crisis management, force mobility,
weapons non-proliferation and high-technology weapons increases as a
proportion of the defence budget. If this prediction is realised, then NATO￿s
institutional structure may need to be tightened and, in so doing, allies￿
discretion will be reduced.
We have also presented alternative NATO expansion scenarios that may
result in an increased exploitation of the large by the small if the alliance
continues to expand. It would be useful to re-examine NATO￿s burdens in
another five years to evaluate if the predicted trend to disproportionate burden
sharing and a greater share of purely public output is realised.
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